The Recommendation Graveyard And Why 121 Accepted Reforms Haven’t Changed Much

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The Australian Government has accepted 121 of the 122 recommendations made by the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, either fully or in principle. Professor Ben Wadham says the next test is whether that acceptance produces changes that serving personnel, veterans and their families can see, verify and experience.

The government has stated that 35 recommendations have been implemented. Wadham and his team at Open Door, Flinders University’s research hub for service personnel, veterans and their families, have been able to verify around nine based on publicly available evidence. The difference raises questions about how implementation is defined, what evidence supports the government’s figure and how the public can assess the progress being reported.

Wadham has spent more than two decades researching military justice, institutional abuse, veteran suicide and cultural reform. Across that history, he has seen the same process repeat when failures inside Defence become public.

“An incident becomes a scandal, an inquiry is established, recommendations are made and those recommendations enter a policy graveyard,” he says. “Without a historical record and sustained scrutiny, the issue is eventually rediscovered and the cycle begins again.”

Tracking what accepted actually means

Open Door’s report card project is intended to interrupt that cycle by tracking the status of all 122 Royal Commission recommendations. It brings the recommendations together and examines the available evidence showing what government, Defence and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs have done in response.

The project distinguishes acceptance from implementation. Acceptance records a government position, while implementation requires identifiable action and evidence that the intended change has occurred. That may include legislation, operational changes, new oversight arrangements, published reporting and measurable improvements in how people experience Defence and veteran systems.

“At the moment, the government says 35 recommendations have been implemented, while we can count about nine,” Wadham says. “We need complete transparency about where every recommendation is up to, what has been completed and what evidence supports that assessment.”

A public report card also creates continuity between the Royal Commission’s findings and the years of implementation that follow. Royal commissions generate intense attention while hearings are underway and when final reports are released. The work of reform then moves into departments, legislation, administrative systems and internal governance processes where public visibility can decline.

This period will determine whether the Royal Commission produces lasting institutional change. Clear reporting would allow veterans, families, researchers and service organisations to assess progress against the original intention of each recommendation, while also identifying delays and areas where implementation has moved away from the problem the recommendation was designed to address.

A long history of recommendations

The Royal Commission examined 57 previous inquiries conducted since 1995. Wadham’s own research identified 35 inquiries into military cultural reform dating back to 1970, along with hundreds of recommendations across mental health and related areas.

This history has created an extensive record of recurring problems involving military justice, abuse, suicide prevention, transition, complaints, leadership and institutional accountability. Wadham argues that the persistence of these issues reflects the way reform has been managed after inquiries conclude.

“Recommendations tend to be dealt with procedurally and administratively,” he says. “The institution refines the process while the cultural and structural conditions producing the harm remain in place.”

Defence is a hierarchical, command-based and highly conformist institution. Its culture is also shaped by fraternity, exceptionalism and a strong preference for managing problems internally. These characteristics influence how policy is interpreted, how complaints are handled, how leaders are held accountable and whether personnel feel safe reporting misconduct.

A recommendation may therefore be implemented at an administrative level while producing limited change in practice. A revised procedure can continue to operate within the same hierarchy, incentives and culture that weakened its predecessor. Progress reporting focused on whether a policy exists may miss whether that policy has changed outcomes.

When reform modernises harm

Wadham describes the current implementation approach as over-proceduralised. He has observed this tendency in proposed legislation and other government responses arising from the Royal Commission, where complex administrative detail can displace the broader purpose of reform.

“The Royal Commission identified systemic, cultural and institutional problems,” he says. “If the response concentrates on refining procedures, it can end up modernising harm. The process looks more contemporary, but the underlying structure continues to produce the same outcomes.”

Structural reform requires attention to the way authority is distributed and reviewed, the consequences attached to reporting, the independence of oversight and the institutional incentives that shape leaders’ decisions. Cultural reform must also confront the code of silence and the expectation that military problems should remain within the military system.

These issues are closely connected to transparency. Institutional harm can continue when information is controlled by the organisation responsible for implementing reform. Limited public evidence makes it difficult to assess whether a recommendation has been completed, partially addressed or absorbed into existing activity with little effect.

Transparency creates a shared basis for accountability. Published implementation criteria, responsible agencies, deadlines, evidence and outcome measures would allow progress to be assessed consistently. It would also help distinguish practical delays from decisions that have narrowed or weakened the original reform.

Taking accountability inside the new commission

Wadham has been appointed to the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission, which was created through recommendation 122. The new body is intended to provide continuing oversight of suicide prevention and the systems affecting serving and former ADF members.

His appointment brings the report card’s central question into the body responsible for monitoring the government’s response. Wadham plans to push for full visibility over the status of every recommendation, including the evidence used to determine when implementation is complete.

“I want complete transparency about where the recommendations stand,” he says. “The Commission needs to be able to show what has been done, how it has been assessed and whether it has produced the change the Royal Commission intended.”

The Commission’s own establishment provides an early test of the implementation process. Creating the body satisfies part of recommendation 122, while its authority, independence, access to information and capacity to drive action will determine whether the recommendation achieves its purpose.

Effective oversight will also require the Commission to examine institutional and structural conditions alongside individual mental health responses. The Royal Commission connected suicide and suicidality with experiences including abuse, military justice processes, involuntary separation, institutional betrayal and failures of leadership. Monitoring reform through a narrow clinical or administrative lens would leave major parts of that evidence outside the assessment.

Making progress visible

The difference between eleven publicly verifiable recommendations and the government’s figure of 35 can be resolved through evidence. A transparent implementation framework would identify the work completed under each recommendation, explain how completion was assessed and show what outcomes have followed.

That information would also help government demonstrate genuine progress. Implementation across Defence, DVA and related agencies is complex, and some reforms will require legislation, new institutions and sustained changes to practice. Public reporting can make that work visible while preserving scrutiny of its quality and pace.

Wadham’s warning is grounded in the record of previous inquiries. Defence and veteran systems have repeatedly recognised many of the problems documented by the Royal Commission. The current reform program offers an opportunity to establish a different pattern, with implementation treated as a measurable change in institutional behaviour and outcomes.

The report card and the new Commission provide two forms of accountability around that work. One applies independent public scrutiny, while the other brings continuing oversight into the government’s formal response. Their value will depend on access to evidence and the willingness of institutions to expose their progress, delays and unresolved problems to examination.

For Wadham, the task extends beyond counting completed recommendations. The central measure is whether reform changes the structures and culture that have allowed harm to recur across decades of inquiries. Full transparency will show whether the latest set of accepted recommendations is producing that change or moving towards the same policy graveyard as those that came before.

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