Australia’s military justice system is undergoing significant reform following the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide and new findings from the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force. While proposed changes strengthen safeguards, transparency and procedural fairness within formal disciplinary processes, questions remain about the broader exercise of administrative and command power across Defence. How these systems interact will shape whether reform addresses the institutional conditions linked to harm among serving personnel or concentrates primarily on improving existing processes.
After years of evidence, the language has shifted. The Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force (IGADF) now accepts that the military justice system can be experienced as harmful. It acknowledges that processes can be “weaponised” and that, even when unintentional, they can leave members feeling targeted or unfairly treated.
It finds that weaponisation “is not widespread, [but] it can and does occur at multiple levels” of the ADF. That is an important admission. It places the justice system within the same reform trajectory opened by the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide; one that moved the analysis from individual pathology to institutional responsibility.
But recognition is only the first step. The harder question is what this means for reform, particularly as Parliament considers the most significant overhaul of military discipline in decades.
The Royal Commission reframed the problem
The Royal Commission did not start with system failure. It started with assumptions about individuals across trauma, resilience, and mental health, and then it did not end there. Instead, it concluded that “culture and systems had an overwhelming part to play” in suicide and suicidality among serving and former personnel.
That is a significant reorientation because it shifts the focus from the individual service member towards the institutional environment that shapes their experience: command structures, career management, and justice.
After decades of inquiries and “hundreds of recommendations,” there had been sustained failure to implement meaningful change, and the explanation, offered bluntly by Commissioner Kaldas, was that across Defence “people simply turned a blind eye… or they simply didn’t care enough to tackle the problems.”
The implication was clear. Reform would require more than incremental change. It would require confronting how power operates inside the system.
The IGADF Inquiry accepts harm, but redefines it
The IGADF Inquiry addresses this issue directly. It recognises that members perceive justice processes as harmful, opaque and excessive. It accepts that rigid or poorly applied procedures can be perceived as punitive and targeted, and it also acknowledges a more subtle aspect.
Even where processes are technically correct, they may still “lead… members to the conclusion that the military justice system has been weaponised against them.”
This key insight echoes the Royal Commission’s finding that legality does not guarantee legitimacy, and that lived experience is central to how justice is understood.
But the Inquiry does something with this insight. It contains it.
From system to misuse
The Inquiry draws a line between the system and its application. It finds that while problems exist, there is limited evidence that the system itself is structured for abuse. Instead, harm is located in misuse of processes, rigid or “blind” implementation, and perceptions of unfairness
In other words, the problem is not the architecture of military justice but how individuals operate within it, and this subtle but decisive shift allows the system to remain fundamentally intact.
This distinction matters because reform is already underway. The Defence Force Discipline Amendment (RCDVS Implementation and Related Measures No. 1) Bill 2026 is currently before Parliament.
It is described as one of the most significant reforms to the military discipline framework in decades. The Bill implements key Royal Commission recommendations, including:
- improved sentencing and transparency
- stronger protections during investigations
- better treatment of mental impairment
- creation of a Defence Mental Health Tribunal
- changes to investigation and disclosure processes.
These are substantial changes. They are also largely focused on disciplinary processes through the formal justice arm governed by the Defence Force Discipline Act (DFDA).
The gap: administrative power
The Royal Commission, and much of the evidence before it, pointed to something broader. It pointed to how harm is often produced not through courts martial or formal discipline, but through administrative processes, including career management decisions, performance action, medical and employment classification, and administrative discharge pathways.
These processes operate with lower thresholds, fewer formal safeguards, and greater discretion. They sit alongside (and often intersect with) disciplinary systems.
The IGADF Inquiry recognises this overlap. It identifies how multiple processes can be applied at once, sometimes creating pressure, confusion, or a sense of “double handling,” but again, it frames this as an issue of coordination and implementation, not structure.
The risk for the DFDA reforms
This creates a potential gap in the current reform agenda. The DFDA Bill strengthens the formal disciplinary system. It improves procedural fairness and aligns military justice more closely with civilian expectations.
But the Royal Commission also noted that involvement in the military justice system itself can be a risk factor for suicide, and importantly, this involvement is not confined to courts martial or formal charges.
It includes the broader system in which discipline and administration intersect. If administrative processes continue to run parallel to disciplinary proceedings, enable outcomes like termination regardless of disciplinary findings, and operate with less transparency and fewer review mechanisms, then strengthening the DFDA alone may not address the core issue.
The system may become more robust in one area, while the same dynamics persist elsewhere.
A familiar pattern
There is a longer history here. The Royal Commission noted that over five decades there have been “around 60 inquiries… and around 750 recommendations,” many of which were not implemented. This suggests that reform efforts have often focused on process improvement without addressing deeper structural issues.
The current moment risks repeating that pattern. The IGADF Inquiry acknowledges harm but locates it largely in misuse. The DFDA Bill responds with procedural reform. Both are necessary. But they may not be sufficient.
Where reform goes next
The key question is whether the system will be rethought, or simply refined. The Royal Commission pointed to a model in which hierarchical power shapes everyday experience, command discretion can be both necessary and harmful, and systems designed for discipline in war can be “exploited negatively in everyday service.”
The IGADF Inquiry comes close to that analysis, but it ultimately stabilises the system around it. Reform, as currently configured, focuses on making processes clearer, making outcomes more transparent, and improving fairness inside existing structures.
These are important gains, but they do not fundamentally change how decisions are made, how power is exercised, or how multiple systems interact.
A narrower reform than the moment might allow
The current reform package opens a window. It incorporates Royal Commission recommendations, modernises parts of the disciplinary system and acknowledges harm in ways that would have been difficult to articulate a decade ago, but it also narrows the scope of change.
By framing “weaponisation” as misuse, misapplication or perception, it limits reform to procedural fixes. The broader structural question (how administrative and disciplinary power combine, overlap and accumulate) remains largely intact.
That is not failure, but it may be a missed opportunity, because the Royal Commission did not simply describe problems, it reframed them.
The question now is whether Defence reform will follow that reframing, or quietly return to more familiar ground. Maybe it is?
